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INVARIANCE AND DEFINABILITY, WITH AND WITHOUT EQUALITY
DENIS BONNAY AND FREDRIK ENGSTRO¨M
Abstract. The dual character of invariance under transformations and definability
by some operations has been used in classical work by for example Galois and Klein.
Following Tarski, philosophers of logic have claimed that logical notions themselves could
be characterized in terms of invariance. In this paper, we generalize a correspondence due
to Krasner between invariance under groups of permutations and definability in L∞∞ so as
to cover the cases (quantifiers, logics without equality) that are of interest in the logicality
debates, getting McGee’s theorem about quantifiers invariant under all permutations and
definability in pure L∞∞ as a particular case. We also prove some optimality results
along the way, regarding the kind of relations which are needed so that every subgroup of
the full permutation group is characterizable as a group of automorphisms.
§1. Introduction. Permutations and relations may be seen as two ways of
encoding information about a domain of objects. In the case of relations, it is
pretty obvious that some piece of information is encoded: a difference is made
between objects between which the relation holds, and objects between which it
does not. This is also true, if slightly less obvious, of permutations. By taking
into account a permutation, it is recognized that some differences between objects
do not matter: given the purpose at hand, one may as well consider that such
and such objects have been interchanged.
Moreover, permutations and relations may be seen as two dual ways of encod-
ing information about objects. Permutations tell us which objects are similar
(they can be mapped to each other), relations tell us which objects are different
(think of a unary relation true of one object and false of another). This duality is
at work whenever mathematicians or physicists consider groups of isomorphisms
and classes of invariants.1 A group of automorphisms is a group of permuta-
tions that respect a given structure: permutations are extracted from a domain
equipped with relations. A class of invariants consists of a class of relations that
respect a given group of permutations: extensions for symbols to be interpreted
in the domain of objects under consideration are extracted from permutations.
In logic, this duality has been extensively investigated within model theory.
Typical questions include the characterization of structures that can be described
Both authors were partially supported by the EUROCORE LogICCC LINT program and
the Swedish Research Council.
1Klein’s Erlanger Program [11] and the systematic study of the duality between groups of
transformations on a space and geometries on that space is a famous example. It was also a
direct inspiration to Tarski [21].
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in terms of their automorphism groups, or more generally how much automor-
phism groups say about the structures they come from (see [4] on model theory
and groups). Within the philosophy of logic, the duality between permutations
and extensions comes to the forefront in debates regarding the characterization
of logical constants. Invariance under all permutations has been taken as the
formal output of a conceptual analysis of what it is to be a logical notion. Thus,
it has been proposed as a mathematical counterpart to the generality of logic (by
Tarski himself, [21]) and to its purely formal nature (by Sher [19] and MacFarlane
[16]).
The aim of the present paper is to bring these two traditions closer together by
adapting some results in model theory to the cases that are discussed by philoso-
phers of logic interested in invariance as a logicality criterion. As a case in point,
we will show how the much quoted theorem by McGee in [17] about invariance
under all permutations and definability in the pure infinitary logic L∞∞ can be
seen as following from a suitable extension of much earlier work by Krasner ([12],
[13]). Our motivation for such a generalization is that a conceptual assessment
of a given logicality criterion stated in terms of invariance properties should be
grounded in a prior evaluation of the significance of the general duality between
groups of permutations and sets of relations and in an independent assessment of
what invariance under groups of permutations (or other kind functions) can and
cannot do in the contexts of interest. From a technical perspective, our starting
point will be Krasner’s work and his so-called abstract Galois theory. Appli-
cation to cases of interest in the logicality debates involve two generalizations.
In order to cover the interpretation of quantifiers, we will to need to consider
structures equipped with second-order relations. In order to cover scenarii in
which the logicality of identity is not presupposed, we will to need to consider
functions that are not injective, as suggested by Feferman [8].
Our main result (Theorem 11 below) provides a unified perspective on the
duality by establishing a correspondence between certain monoids of relations
and sets of operations closed under definability in an infinitary language without
equality. In Section 2, we recall Krasner’s correspondence between classes of re-
lations of possibly infinite arity closed under definability in L∞∞ and subgroups
of the permutation group. We show how Krasner’s correspondence relates to
the standard model-theoretic characterization of groups of permutations which
are the automorphism groups of a first-order structure (with relations of finite
arity) as closed groups in the topology of point-wise convergence. Section 3 is
devoted to extending Krasner’s correspondence to second-order relations. We
prove some optimality results along the way: what kind of relations are really
needed so that every subgroup is the automorphism group of a class of relations?
In the first-order case, infinitary relations were necessary. Second-order binary
relations suffice to do the job, but second-order unary relations do not. The next
section is devoted to relaxing the assumption of injectivity, extending the corre-
spondence to logics without equality. Finally, we draw some lessons in Section 5
for the logicality debate.
§2. Abstract Galois theory and permutation groups.
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2.1. Krasner’s abstract Galois theory. To begin with, we shall recall the
fundamentals of Krasner’s abstract Galois theory, following in particular Poizat
[18]. The starting point of Krasner is classical Galois theory, in which a particular
instance of the general duality we have outlined is at play. Classical Galois theory
is the study of the duality between the subgroups of the automorphism group of
certain types of field extensions, called Galois extensions, and the intermediate
fields in the field extension.
A field is an algebraic structure with addition, multiplication, inverses and
units. If k ⊆ K are both fields then we say that K : k is a field extension; it is
Galois if it is algebraic, normal, and separable (definitions may be found in [14]).
Given a field extension K : k let G be the Galois group of K : k, i.e., the group
of automorphisms of K fixing the elements of k point-wise. Define the following
pair of mappings:
Fix(H) = { a ∈ K | ha = a for all h ∈ H }
Gal(A) = { g ∈ G | ga = a for all a ∈ A }
whereH is any subset of G and A any subset of the domain ofK. The fundamen-
tal theorem of Galois theory says that, for finite Galois extensions, Fix(Gal(A))
is the smallest subfield of K including k∪A and that Gal(Fix(H)) is the smallest
subgroup of G including H . There is thus a one-to-one correspondence between
fields K ′ such that k ⊆ K ′ ⊆ K and subgroups of G.
According to Krasner, “the true origin of Galois theory [does not lie] in algebra,
in the strict sense of the word, but in logic” ([13], p. 163). This claim is to be
substantiated by exhibiting a general duality, between automorphism groups and
relations definable over a structure. Consider a domain Ω, SΩ the full symmetric
group on Ω and a set r of relations on Ω; these relations may include infinite
arity relations regarded as subsets of Ωα where α is some ordinal number. We
now define the following pair of mappings:
Inv(H) = {R ⊆ Ωα | hR = R for all h ∈ H,α ≤ |Ω| }
Aut(r) = { g ∈ SΩ | gR = R for all R ∈ r }
The logic L∞∞ is the infinitary generalization of the predicate calculus where
formulas are built by means of arbitrarily long conjunctions and disjunctions and
by means of arbitrarily long universal and existential quantifiers sequences (see
e.g. [10]). The L∞∞-closure of r is the set of relations definable in L∞∞ from
relations in r. The following Theorem is essentially2 shown by Krasner in [12]:
Theorem 1. Let Ω and SΩ be as above, H ⊆ SΩ any set of permutations and
r any set of relations on Ω of arities at most |Ω|.
1. Inv(Aut(r)) is the L∞∞-closure of r.
2. Aut(Inv(H)) is the smallest subgroup of SΩ including H.
2The qualification ‘essentially’ is due to the fact that Krasner thinks directly in terms
of closure under ‘logical’ operations on relations rather in terms of definability in a formal
language.
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Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the subgroups of the full
symmetric group SΩ of Ω and the sets of relations closed under definability in
L∞∞.
How does this relate with the original correspondence of classical Galois the-
ory? The first half of the fundamental theorem of Galois Theory can be derived
from the first half of Theorem 1.3 Given a field extension K : k and A ⊆ K, let
r be the set of addition, multiplication, inverse and the relation Ra = { a } for
every a ∈ k∪A. By definition, we have that Gal(A) = Aut(r). Now Inv(Aut(r))
and Fix(Gal(A)) are not exactly on a par, because Krasner’s theory takes sets
of relations as values instead of, as in the classical Galois theory, sets of points.
However, the set of fixed points can be extracted from the set of fixed relations
by observing that an element a ∈ Ω is fixed by a permutation iff the singleton re-
lation { a } is fixed. Given that Inv(Aut(r)) is closed under definability in L∞∞,
it is immediate that this set of fixed points is a subfield of K. In order to get the
first half of the fundamental Galois theorem, one also needs to show that it is
included in any subfield extending k ∪A. Krasner proves this in [13] by showing
that if Ra is definable in L∞∞ over r, then a can be reached from elements in
k ∪A by means of the field operations.4
2.2. Permutation groups and topology. Krasner’s result shows that for
any group of permutations of Ω there is some set of relations r on Ω such that
Aut(r) is exactly that group. This is not true if we restrict the relations to be
of finite arity. If r is a set of relations of finite arity then (Ω, r) is a ‘standard’
first-order relational structure and, obviously, the group Aut(r) coincides with
the automorphism group of the first-order structure (Ω, r). However it is not true
that every subgroup of the full permutation group is the automorphism group of
a first-order structure (with only finite arity relations). We will give a detailed
proof of the well known characterization of autormophism groups of first-order
structures in terms of topological properties. This is done partly to set up the
scene for the next section (but see also [4]).
First we need to introduce the topology, the product topology, on the group
of permutations that we will be using. Let Ω be any infinite set equipped with
the discrete topology, i.e., the topology in which every set is open. Let G be
the full symmetric group SΩ on Ω, i.e., the group of all permutations of Ω. The
stabilizer Ga¯ of a finite tuple a¯ ∈ Ωk is the set of all permutations in G keeping
all elements in a¯ fixed, i.e.,
Ga¯ = { g ∈ G | ga¯ = a¯ } .
The symmetric group SΩ on Ω is a subset of Ω
Ω; let G inherit the product
topology from ΩΩ, i.e., a basis for this topology are the (right or left) cosets of
stabilizers of finite tuples, that is, sets of the following form:
Ga¯,b¯ = { g ∈ G | ga¯ = b¯ } ,
3To our knowledge, the question regarding the other halves is still open.
4This amounts to a property of eliminability of quantifiers. Krasner gives a general char-
acterization of structures having this property. See Poizat [18] regarding connections with
contemporary model theory.
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where a¯, b¯ ∈ Ωk.5
This is the topology of pointwise convergence: The (topological) closure of a
set A ⊆ G consists of all permutations g ∈ G such that for every k and every
a¯ ∈ Ωk there is f ∈ A such that f(a¯) = g(a¯).6
Given a subgroup H of G let OHa¯ = { ha¯ | h ∈ H } be the orbit of a¯ under
H . Orbits provide a canonical way of ‘translating’ a group of permutations
on a domain into relations on that domain. (Ω, OHa¯ )a¯∈Ωk is thus a first-order
relational structure, called the canonical structure of H .
The following well-known folklore result characterizes the subgroups of G
which are automorphism groups of a first-order structure (with only finite arity
relations):
Proposition 2. Let H be a subgroup of G. The following are equivalent:
1. There is a first-order structure M with domain Ω whose automorphism
group is H.
2. H is the automorphism group of the canonical structure of H, (Ω, OHa¯ )a¯∈Ωk .
3. H is closed.
Proof. (1) implies (3): Let g ∈ G be in the closure of H , i.e., for any a¯ ∈ Ωk
there is h ∈ Aut(M) which is identical to g on a¯. Let R be a relation in M ,
a¯ ∈ Ωk and h ∈ Aut(M) such that ga¯ = ha¯, then Ra¯ iff Rha¯ iff Rga¯ and so
R is invariant under g. Similarly we can show that any relation, constant and
function inM is invariant under g; thus g ∈ Aut(M); and Aut(M) = H is closed.
(2) implies (1): Obvious.
(3) implies (2): Let M be the canonical structure of H . Clearly H ⊆ Aut(M)
since H respects all its orbits, i.e., for all h ∈ H , a¯ ∈ OH
b¯
iff ha¯ ∈ OH
b¯
. Assume
g ∈ Aut(M) and a¯ ∈ Ωk, then ga¯ ∈ OHa¯ and so there is an h ∈ H such that
ga¯ = ha¯. This shows that g is in the closure of H ; but since H is closed we have
Aut(M) ⊆ H , proving that H is the automorphism group of M . ⊣
The proof actually shows that for any subgroup H of G the automorphism
group of the canonical structure of H is the closure of H .
In order to see that not all subgroups of G are automorphism groups of first-
order structures, it is, using the proposition, sufficient to find a subgroup of G
which is not closed. Let the support of a permutation g of Ω be the set of points
moved by g, i.e., the set { a ∈ Ω | ga 6= a }. The set H of permutations with
5This topology makes G into a topological group which means that the operations of mul-
tiplication (in this case composition) and taking inverses are continuous. As with topological
groups in general, all open subgroups are also closed: let H be an open subgroup of G then
the complement of H is the union of all cosets gH of H which are disjoint from H, and thus
the complement of H is open.
6If Ω = { a0, a1, . . . } is countable then the topology is completely metrizable by the metric
d(g, h) = 1/2k if g 6= h and k is the least number such that gak 6= hak or g
−1ak 6= h
−1ak , and
d(g, g) = 0. Thus, a sequence of permutations g0, g1, . . . converges to g if and only if, for any
k, gnak = gak for all sufficiently large n. It should also be noted that G is not a closed subset
of ΩΩ which means that there are sequences gi of permutations of Ω converging to a function
f which is not a permutation: Let Ω = N, the sequence
(0, 1), (0, 1, 2), (0, 1, 2, 3), . . .
converges to the function f : n 7→ n+ 1 which is not a permutation.
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finite support is a non-closed subgroup of G: Take any permutation g ∈ G and
any a¯ ∈ Ωk we can find h ∈ H such that ga¯ = ha¯ by extending the bijection
g|a¯ : { a¯ } → { ga¯ } to a permutation of A = { a¯ } ∪ { ga¯}. Let then h be this
permutation on A and the identity function outside A. This shows that the
closure of H is the full group G, and since not every permutation has a finite
support, H is not closed.
Hence the use of relations of infinite arity in Krasner’s correspondence is indeed
necessary: For non-closedH , ifH = Aut(M) thenM includes relations of infinite
arity.
There is a connection between the allowed arities of relations in the structures
and the topological closure property characterizing automorphism groups as the
following proposition shows. To see this, let us define the α-topology, for α an
infinite ordinal, on G in the following manner. The basic open sets are of the
form
Ga¯,b¯ { g ∈ G | ga¯ = b¯ } ,
where |a¯| = |b¯| < α. The ω-topology coincides with the ordinary product topol-
ogy described above. It should be noted that the β-topology is a refinement of
the α-topology if α ≤ β, which means that an open set in the α-topology is also
open in the β-topology. If we relax the definition of a first-order structure to
include relations of arity less than α and define α-orbits of a subgroup H to be
OHa¯ = { ha¯ | h ∈ H } ,
where now a¯ ∈ Ωα; then the proof of Proposition 2 goes through with the
canonical structure ofH replaced by (Ω, OHa¯ )a¯∈Ωα and ‘closed’ replaced by ‘closed
in the α-topology,’ giving the following generalization:
Proposition 3. Let H be a subgroup of G and α an infinite ordinal, then the
following are equivalent:
1. There is a first order structure M with domain Ω and relations of arity less
than α whose automorphism group is H.
2. H is the automorphism group of the relational structure (Ω, OHa¯ )a¯∈Ωα .
3. H is closed in the α-topology.
Krasner’s result that every subgroup of G is Aut(M) for some relational struc-
ture M when relations of infinite arity are allowed (first half of Theorem 1)
follows from Proposition 3. The (|Ω|+1)-topology is the discrete topology, i.e.
every set is open: If g ∈ G and a¯ is an enumeration of Ω then
Ga¯,ga¯ = { g }
is a basic open set. Thus every set of permutations is the union of basic open
sets, and therefore open; and therefore also closed. Hence, if relations of arity
|Ω| are allowed, every group of permutations will be the automorphism group of
some relational (infinitary) structure.
§3. Quantifiers come into play.
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3.1. Second-order relations, L∞∞ and Krasner’s correspondence.
We shall now extend Krasner’s correspondence to second-order operations, in
order to account for quantifier extensions, which have been the traditional focus
of the debates regarding logicality and invariance. In this subsection, we state
the corresponding generalization of Theorem 1 and prove its first part.
A finite second-order relation Q of type (i1, ..., ik) on Ω is a subset of P(Ω
i1 )×
... × P(Ωik) for finite k and finite i1,...,ik. A second-order structure q on a
domain Ω is a set of (finite-ary) first-order and second-order relations on Ω.
A permutation g on Ω preserves a second-order relation Q of type (i1, ..., ik)
if (Ri1 , ..., Rik) ∈ Q iff (gRi1 , ..., gRik) ∈ Q where Rij , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, are first-
order relations of arities ij. The mappings Aut and Inv admit a straightforward
generalization to the present setting: Aut(q) is the group of permutations which
preserve all first-order and second-order relations in q, and Inv(H), for H ⊆ G,
is the set of first-order and second-order relations which are preserved by all
permutations in H .
Given a second-order structure q, L∞∞(q) is an interpreted language in the
logic L∞∞: it is the language whose signature matches the structure q and
whose predicate and quantifier symbols are interpreted by the relations in q.
The syntax and semantics for symbols interpreted by second-order relations is
familiar from generalized quantifier theory (see [15]). As a case in point, let us
recall what are the intended syntactic and semantic clauses for a second-order
relation of type (2): Let Q in q be of type (2), L∞∞(q) is then equipped with
a matching quantifier symbol Q¯. The syntactic clause for Q¯ has it that if φ is a
formula of L∞∞(q), so is Q¯x1x2 φ. The satisfaction clause for Q¯ is given by
Ω, q  Q¯x1x2 φ [σ]
iff
||φ||σx1,x2 ∈ Q
where σ is an assignment over Ω and
||φ||σx = {(a1, a2) ∈ Ω
2 | Ω, q  φ [σ[x1 := a1, x2 := a2]]}.
We shall need to consider definability in L∞∞(q) for a given q. Without loss
of generality, let Q be a second-order relation of type (2). We say that Q is
definable in L∞∞(q) iff there is a sentence φQ(R¯) in L∞∞(q) expanded with a
binary predicate symbol R¯ such that
Ω, q, R  φQ(R¯)
iff
R ∈ Q
where R is a binary first-order relation on Ω interpreting R¯. The L∞∞-closure
of a second-order structure q is the set of finite first-order and second-order
relations on Ω which are definable in L∞∞(q).
We can now state the generalization of Theorem 1 to second-order structures
and automorphism groups thereof:
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Theorem 4. Let Ω be a domain and G = SΩ the symmetric group on Ω,
H ⊆ G any set of permutations and q a second-order structure on Ω.
1. Q ∈ Inv(Aut(q)) iff Q is definable in L∞∞(q). The same holds for relations
R.
2. Aut(Inv(H)) is the smallest subgroup of G including H.
We shall postpone the discussion and the proof of the second part of the
theorem till the next subsection. Regarding the first part, the proof that any
relation definable in L∞∞(q) is invariant under the automorphisms of q is a
straightforward induction on the complexity of formulas of L∞∞(Q). What
remains to be proven is the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Let Q be a first-order or second-order relation on Ω, if Q ∈ Inv(Aut(q)),
then Q is definable in L∞∞(q).
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we shall give the proof for Q a second-order
relation of type (2). So let Q be invariant under the automorphims of q. We
first construct the sentence φQ(R¯) which defines it. Let us fix an enumeration
I → Ω of the elements in Ω and, given a set of variables X of cardinality |Ω|, an
enumeration I → X of the variables in X . Let σ be a partial assignment over X
defined by σ(xi) = ai for i ∈ I.
For any relation S on Ω and for any symbol T¯ matching the type of S, let the
description ∆S(T¯ ) of S by T¯ be as follows. If S is a first-order relation of arity k,
∆S(T¯ ) is the conjunction of formulas of the form T¯ xi1 ...xik or ¬T¯ xi1 ...xik which
are satisfied in Ω, S under σ. Similarly, if S is a second-order relation, say again
of type (2), ∆S(T¯ ) is the conjunction of formulas of the form
T¯ y1, y2
∨
(i,j)∈K
(y1 = xi ∧ y2 = xj)
or
¬T¯ y1, y2
∨
(i,j)∈K
(y1 = xi ∧ y2 = xj)
for K ⊆ I × I, which are satisfied in Ω, S under σ. Moreover, let ψ be the
following formula
∧
i,j∈I,i6=j
xi 6= xj ∧ ∀y
∨
i∈I
y = xi
that is, ψ says that σ is a bijection from X onto Ω.
φQ may now be written down as
∀X
((∧
S∈q
∆S(S¯) ∧ ψ
)
→
∨
U∈Q
∆U (R¯)
)
where ∀X is short for the infinite sequence of universal quantifiers ∀x1, ..., ∀xi, ...
quantifying over every variable in X .
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We now prove that Ω, q, R  φQ(R¯) iff R ∈ Q. From left to right, if φQ(R¯) is
true in Ω, q, R, we have in particular that∧
S∈q
∆S(S¯) ∧ ψ →
∨
U∈Q
∆U (R¯)(1)
is satisfied under σ. But, by construction, the premise of (1) is satisfied under
σ, hence there is a relation U ∈ Q such that ∆U (R¯) is satisfied under σ when R¯
is interpreted by R. This forces U = R, hence R ∈ Q as required.
From right to left, let R be a first-order relation in Q and σ′ a partial assign-
ment on X . Assume that
Ω, q, R 
∧
S∈q
∆S(S¯) ∧ ψ [σ
′].
We need to show that Ω, R 
∨
U∈Q∆U (R¯) [σ
′].
Since ψ is satisfied under σ′, σ′ is a bijection, hence there is a permutation f
on Ω such that f ◦ σ′ = σ. Moreover, since
∧
S∈q∆S(S¯) is satisfied under σ
′, f
is an automorphism of q, hence f preserves Q.
By definition, Ω, fR  ∆fR(R¯) [σ]. Since σ = f ◦ σ′, this implies Ω, R 
∆fR(R¯) σ
′. Since f preserves Q and R ∈ Q, we also have fR ∈ Q. Therefore
∆fR(R¯) is one the disjuncts in
∨
U∈Q∆U (R¯) and the formula is satisfied under
σ′ as required. ⊣
In [17], McGee proved that, on a given domain, an “operation is invariant
under all permutations if and only if it is described by some formula of L∞∞”
(p. 572). This result follows quite directly from what we have:7 Consider the
empty structure ∅. Aut(∅) is the group G of all permutations. By the first part
of Theorem 4, Inv(G) is the L∞∞-closure of ∅, which is exactly McGee’s result.
It should be noted that the proof of Lemma 5 itself is a rather straightforward
generalization of Krasner’s proof in [12]. The possibility to describe every subset
of Ωk by means of formulas of L∞∞ is sufficient to handle the extension to
second-order relations.
3.2. A topology for second-order structures. We shall now turn to the
second half of Theorem 4 and ask when a group of permutations is the automor-
phism group of a structure, in a context where second-order relations are allowed
but all relations are finitary. As earlier with Proposition 2, we shall base our an-
swer on topological properties of groups of permutations. We will see that if we
allow quantifiers of type (2) then all groups of permutations are automorphism
groups of some second-order structure. However, the case is quiet different when
we only allow monadic quantifiers, i.e., quantifiers of type (1, 1, . . . , 1). There
is a natural topology such that exactly the closed groups are the automorphism
groups of monadic second-order structures.
We say a second-order structure is monadic if all relations are relations on the
power set of Ω. A monadic second-order structure on Ω is nothing else than a
first-order structure on Ω together with a relational first-order structure on the
7McGee’s operations are actually defined as functions from sequences of sets of assignments
to sets of assignments. This difference does not matter in the present context, since McGee’s
operation may be translated into second-order relations and back in such a way that invariance
under sets of permutations is preserved.
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power set P(Ω) of Ω. Let SP(Ω) be the symmetric group on P(Ω). The symmetric
group G = SΩ on Ω embeds in a natural way in SP(Ω), by the mapping g 7→ g
∗
where
g∗A = { ga | a ∈ A } .
Let SP(Ω) be equipped with the product topology.
The second-order topology on G is defined by letting the basic open sets be
GA¯,B¯ = { g ∈ G | g
∗Ai = Bi for all i }
where A¯ = A0, . . . , An and B¯ = B0, . . . , Bn are subsets of Ω. As is seen directly
from the definition of the basic open sets the second-order topology on G is the
topology induced by the embedding ∗ : G→ SP(Ω).
Lemma 6. The set G∗ = { g∗ | g ∈ G } is a closed subgroup of SP(Ω).
Proof. Since ∗ respects composition G∗ is a group. To see that it is closed
let h ∈ SΩ be in the closure of G∗, i.e., for all A¯ = A0, . . . , An there is g ∈ G
such that hAi = g
∗Ai for i ≤ n. Define f ∈ G by fa ∈ h { a }, this uniquely
determines f since the set h { a } is a singleton set: There is g ∈ G such that
h { a } = g∗ { a } = { ga }.
Assume now that h /∈ G∗, then there is A ⊆ Ω such that hA 6= f∗A. We may
assume that there is a ∈ hA \ f∗A. For otherwise h(Ac) \ f∗(Ac) 6= ∅ since the
complement (f∗A)c of f∗A is f∗(Ac) and also that h(Ac) = (hA)c since there is
g ∈ G such that g∗A = hA and g∗(Ac) = h(Ac) (take A¯ = A,Ac).
Let g ∈ G be such that g∗A = hA and g∗ { f−1a } = h { f−1a } (take A¯ =
A, { f−1(a) }). Thus gf−1a = ff−1a = a and so f−1a ∈ A contradicting that
a /∈ f∗A. ⊣
From this lemma it follows that a set A ⊆ G is closed in the second-order
topology iff A∗ is closed in SP(Ω).
By using Proposition 2 and considering a second-order monadic structure on
the domain Ω as a first-order structure on P(Ω), we can prove the characteriza-
tion of automorphism groups of monadic second-order structures.
Proposition 7. Let H be a subgroup of G. The following are equivalent:
1. There is a second order monadic structure q with domain Ω whose auto-
morphism group is H.
2. H is the automorphism group of the second-order structure
M = (Ω, OH
∗
R¯
)R¯∈(P(Ω))k .
3. H is closed in the second-order topology.
Proof. The implication 2 ⇒ 1 is trivial.
To prove that 1 ⇒ 3 let q be a second-order structure with Aut(q) = H , let
M be the first-order part of q and q′ the second-order part. By Proposition
2 Aut(M) ⊆ G is closed. Now, q′ can be seen as a first-order structure on
the domain P(Ω), and by applying Proposition 2 to this structure on P(Ω)
we get that AutP(Ω)(q
′) ⊆ SP(Ω) is closed.
8 By the comment after Lemma 6
8 Aut
P(Ω)(q
′) is the group of all permutations of P(Ω) respecting the quantifiers in q′.
Compare this to AutΩ(q
′), which is the set of all permutations of Ω respecting the quantifiers
in q′.
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AutΩ(q
′) ⊆ G is closed since
AutΩ(q
′)∗ = G∗ ∩ AutP(Ω)(q
′),
and both of these subgroups are closed. To conclude the argument it is enough
to observe that Aut(q) = Aut(M) ∩ Aut(q′) and that both of these groups are
closed.
For the last implication 3 ⇒ 2 it is enough to observe that H∗ ⊆ SP(Ω) is
closed and thus, by Proposition 2, H∗ is the automorphism group of
(P(Ω), OH
∗
R¯
)R¯∈(P(Ω))k
and that g ∈ G respects Q iff g∗ ∈ SP(Ω) respects Q, as a first-order quantifier
on P(Ω). Thus, H is the automorphism group of M. ⊣
To conclude the discussion of automorphism groups of monadic second-order
structures we prove that not all subgroups of G are closed in the second-order
topology, implying that not all subgroups are automorphism groups of such
structures which proves that the second part of Theorem 4 can not hold if we
restrict Inv(·) to only include monadic quantifiers. The following example of
non-closed subgroup comes from Stoller [20].
Assume that Ω is countable and ≤ well-orders Ω. Say that a permutation p of
Ω is a piece-wise order isomorphism if there are partitions (Ai)i≤k and (Bi)i≤k
of Ω such that p restricted to Ai is an order isomorphism from Ai to Bi. Let H
be the set of all such piece-wise order isomorphisms.
Lemma 8 ([20]). H is a proper dense subgroup of G.
Proof. For simplicity assume that Ω = N and that the ordering ≤ coincides
with the usual ordering of the natural numbers.
It is rather straight-forward to check that H is a subgroup. That it is proper
follows from the following argument. Let g(m) be (n+1)2− (m+1−n2) where
n2 ≤ m < (n+ 1)2. The function g is defined so that it reverses arbitrarily long
sequences of natural numbers: g(k2 + a) = (k + 1)2 − a − 1 for 0 ≤ a ≤ 2k
which means that g reverses the sequence k2, k2+1, . . . , k2+2k of length 2k+1.
Assume that there are partitions (Ai)i≤k and (Bi)i≤k of N into k blocks such
that g restricted to Ai is an order isomorphism from Ai to Bi. By the pigeonhole
principle two elements of the sequence k2, k2 + 1, . . . , k2 + 2k of 2k+ 1 is in the
same block Ai. That contradicts the assumption that g is an order isomorphism
from Ai to Bi.
To see that H is not closed take some g ∈ G. We prove that for any A¯ there
is h ∈ H such that g∗ and h∗ agrees on A¯, showing that g is in the closure of H .
Let the image of A¯ = A0, . . . Ak under g be B¯ = B0, . . . , Bk. For any subset N
of [k] = { 0, 1, . . . , k } let
AN =
⋂
{Ai | i ∈ N } ∩
⋂
{Aci | i /∈ N } ,
and define BN similarily. Then, for any N ⊆ [k], g maps AN to BN ; and also
the AN s are pairwise disjoint. Clearly there is an h ∈ H mapping the AN s to
the BN s. It is now easy to see that h also maps the Ais to the Bis. Thus, the
closure of H is G and H is dense in G. ⊣
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Let us now prove the second half of Theorem 4 by observing that the gener-
alization of the second-order topology on G where we regard the permuations of
G as permuting binary relations on Ω is the discrete topology and thus that any
subgroup is closed in this topology:
Proposition 9. The topology on G given by the basic open sets
GR¯,S¯ = { g ∈ G | g
∗(Ri) = Si }
where R¯ = R0, . . . , Rn and S¯ = S0, . . . , Sn are subsets of Ω
2 is the discrete
topology.
Proof. Let < well-order Ω and let g ∈ G be some permutation of Ω. Let
R = { g(<) } be the image of < under g. Then the basic open set G<,R is the
singleton set { g }: If h(<) = R and h ∈ G then by transfinite induction on x
over < we see that h(x) = g(x) for every x ∈ Ω and thus that h = g. ⊣
Let now H be any subgroup of G, by the proposition H is closed in this
topology. By an argument similar to the case of monadic second-order structures
H∗ is a closed subgroup of the symmetric group of P(Ω2). Thus by Proposition 2
there is a relational structure on P(Ω2) whose automorphism group is H∗. This
structure is a second-order structure on Ω having H as its automorphism group.
Thus, we may conclude that any subgroup of G is the automorphism group of
a second-order structure with quantifiers of type (2, 2 . . . , 2); proving something
slightly stronger than the second half of Theorem 4.
§4. Invariance under similarities. In the present section, we propose an
extension of Krasner’s correspondence to languages without equality. Our mo-
tivations for doing so are twofold. First, we aim at greater generality: we shall
show that the correspondence in Theorem 4 between groups of bijections and sets
of first-order and second-order operations closed under definability is a special
case of an even more encompassing correspondence. Second, invariance criteria
in which functions are not required to be one-to-one have recently been proposed,
see Feferman [8] and Casanovas [5]:9 the question is how much the situation does,
or does not, change when invariance is thus liberalized.
The generalized correspondence is to hold between monoids of similarities and
sets of operations closed under definability in L−∞∞. A similarity pi on a domain
Ω is simply a binary relation pi ⊆ Ω×Ω, such that for all a ∈ Ω there is a b ∈ Ω
with a pi b and for all b ∈ Ω there is a ∈ Ω such that a pi b. L −∞∞ is the equality-
free version of L∞∞. For a given signature, its formulas are all the formulas of
L∞∞ that do not contain the equality symbol. In their recent model-theoretic
studies of equality-free languages, Casanovas, Dellunde and Jansana have shown
that structure preserving similarities play for first-order logic without equality
9Casanovas shows that several non-equivalent ways of defining of invariance appear when
functions are allowed that are not one-one. We are concerned here with the what he calls
‘Feferman invariance’, as defined by Feferman in [8] and that we take to be the most natural
notion of invariance in that context. See [5] for a detailed examination of the other options, as
well as for characterization results for these other options.
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the same role that isomorphisms play for first-order logic with equality, see [6].10
The present extension of Krasner’s correspondence pushes the analogy further.
Our extension comes with a twist. In L∞∞, on a fixed domain and with
parameters, all subsets of the domain are definable. This is not the case in L −∞∞.
Generalized quantifiers may add expressive power that remains ineffective even
when parameters are allowed. As a consequence, the proof method used in the
proof of Theorem 4 breaks down. It relied on describing ‘from below’ the action
of invariant quantifiers by describing elementwise the sets and relations they
apply to. Such a strategy is no longer available.
To see this, let us first define invariance under similarity. A relation R ⊆ Ωk
is invariant under the similarity relation pi on Ω if for all a¯ pi b¯ we have a¯ ∈ R
iff b¯ ∈ R. Given a quantifier Q over the domain Ω we say that Q is invariant
under pi if for all relations R1, . . . , Rk, S1, . . . , Sk on Ω such that Ri pi Si we have
〈R1, . . . Rk, 〉 ∈ Q iff 〈S1, . . . , Sk〉 ∈ Q. Consider now, as an extreme case, the
operations q = {⊤,⊥, QE}, where ⊤ and ⊥ are the two trivial unary relations11
defined by ⊤ = Ω, ⊥ = ∅ and QE = {{0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, ...}}. One may show
that QO = {{1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, ...}} is invariant under all similarities under which
operations in q are invariant. But in order to describe from below the action of
QO, we would need to be able to define the set of odd numbers. As can easily
be proven by induction, this is not possible in a language in which ⊤ and ⊥ are
the only relation symbols, even in the presence of QE.
Our alternative strategy will consist in showing that Krasner’s correspondence
holds when the extra expressive power is discarded. More precisely, we will show
that the desired definability and closure properties hold when attention is limited
to the action of generalized quantifiers on definable sets and relations. Note
however that even though QO is not definable from below in L −∞∞(q), it is
indeed definable full stop, simply by the formula QEx ¬Px. Therefore, the
question whether a version of Krasner’s correspondence without a restriction to
definable relations holds is still open.
Given a set of operations q and a quantifier Q, let Q↾q be the restriction of Q
to relations definable in L∞∞(q) (with parameters):
Q↾q = { 〈R1 . . . Rk〉 ∈ Q | Ri is definable in L
−
∞∞(q, a)a∈Ω, 1 ≤ i ≤ k }
Let q↾ be all the relations in q and all the restrictions Q↾q of quantifiers in q. It
is easy to see that L −∞∞(q) and L
−
∞∞(q
↾) are elementary equivalent. In that
sense, restricting quantifiers to their definable parts does not change the effective
expressive power of the logic.
Restriction to definable parts on the side of quantifiers will correspond to a
similar restriction on the side of the invariance condition. Invariance will only
be required with respect to relations that respect the underlying equivalence
relation generated by the operations or the similarities under scrutiny. A set of
10In [6], Casanovas & alii use the term ‘relativeness correspondence’, whereas Feferman in [8]
goes for ‘similarity relation’. Note also that, instead of similarity relations, one may work with
surjective functions. Any relational composition of surjective maps or inverses of surjective
maps is a similarity relation, and any similarity relation can be written as the composition
f ◦ g−1, where f : C → B and g : C → A are onto, see [6] for more details.
11It is useful to assume that there are symbols in the language to express these, in order to
guarantee that L−∞∞(q) is not empty.
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operations q gives us an equivalence relation ∼q corresponding to definability
with parameters in L −∞,∞(q), that is a ∼q b iff∧
φ∈L−∞∞(q)
∀x¯(φ(a, x¯)↔ φ(b, x¯)).(2)
Similarly, a set of similarities Π generates an equivalence relation by the fol-
lowing condition:
a ≈Π b iff for all c¯ ∈ Ω
k there exists pi ∈ Π such that a, c¯ pi b, c¯, for a finite k.
Invariance is now parametrized by the equivalence relations ∼ we are con-
sidering. Given a similarity pi, a quantifier Q is ∼-invariant under pi if for any
R¯, S¯ ∈ P(Ωk1) × . . . × P(Ωkl), all invariant under ∼, if R¯ pi S¯ then R¯ ∈ Q iff
S¯ ∈ Q. As before, a relation is ∼-invariant under pi if it is invariant under pi.
This yields the main definitions of this section:
Definition 10.
- Let Inv(Π) be the set of all relations R and quantifiers Q on Ω which are
≈Π-invariant under all similarities in Π.
- Sim(q) is the set of similarities pi such that all relations and quantifiers in
q are ∼q-invariant under pi.
Observe that when Π is a group H of permutations then Inv(Π) = Inv(H),
where Inv(H) uses the old definition of Inv. This follows directly from the fact
that ≈Π in this case is equality.
In general, Sim(q) is not a group, because the similarities need not be invert-
ible. The relevant closure properties for Sim(q) are the following. A set Π of
similarities is a monoid with involution if it is closed under composition and tak-
ing converses.12. Moreover, Π is full if it is a monoid with involution, ≈Π ∈ Π,
and closed under taking subsimilarities, i.e., such that if pi ∈ Π and pi′ ⊆ pi is a
similarity then pi′ ∈ Π.
We are now ready to state Krasner’s correspondence for the equality-free case,
with the aforementioned restriction to the definable parts of quantifiers:
Theorem 11. Let q be a set of operations and Π a set of similarities, then
1. Q ∈ Inv(Sim(q)) iff Q↾q is definable in L−∞∞(q), and R ∈ Inv(Sim(q)) iff
R is definable in L−∞∞(q).
2. Sim(Inv(Π)) is the smallest full monoid including Π.
As a test case let q include equality. Then ∼q is equality and Sim(q) = Aut(q).
Theorem 11 says that a quantifierQ is in Inv(Aut(q)) iff it is definable in L−∞∞(q)
which is the same as being definable in L∞∞(q). Thus, part one of Theorem 4
follows easily from Theorem 11. Also part two follows since if H is a subgroup
of the symmetric group of Ω then ≈H is nothing but equality and Aut(Inv(H))
is just Sim(Inv(H)) which is H by (2) of Theorem 11.
In order to prove Krasner’s correspondence for definable relations, we shall
need some technical machinery. We define two mappings: ·/∼ and ∪ which
will operate on several different domains, but in a similar way. Let ∼ be an
12The converse R−1 of R is such that a R−1 b iff b R a.
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equivalence relation on Ω, [a] = { b | a ∼ b } be the equivalence class of a, and
Ω/ ∼ the set of all equivalence classes. Given R ⊆ Ωk we define the relation
R/∼ on Ω/∼ by
R/∼ = { 〈[a1], . . . , [ak]〉 ∈ (Ω/∼)
k | 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ R } .
If R ⊆ (Ω/∼)k then
∪R = { 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ Ω
k | 〈[a1], . . . , [ak]〉 ∈ R } .
Similarily, given a quantifier Q on Ω, the quantifier Q/∼ on Ω/∼ is defined by
Q/∼ = { 〈R1, . . . , Rk〉 | 〈∪R1, . . . ,∪Rk〉 ∈ Q } ,
and given a quantifier Q on Ω/∼, the quantifier ∪Q on Ω is defined by
∪Q = { 〈∪R1, . . . ,∪Rk〉 | 〈R1, . . . , Rk〉 ∈ Q } .
Thus, given a set q of operations on Ω and an equivalence relation ∼ on Ω, we
get a set q/∼ of operations on Ω/∼. Similarly we can go from a set of operations
on Ω/∼ to a set of operations on Ω by the operation ∪.
Since there are at most 22
|Ω|
many non-equivalent formulas with |Ω| free vari-
ables the conjuction in (2) above can be bounded by that number, and thus (2)
is a formula of L −∞∞(q). We now get the following easy lemma.
Lemma 12. For any a and b in Ω, a ∼q b iff∧
φ∈L−∞∞(q)
∀x(φ(a, x) ↔ φ(b, x)),
where the conjuntion is only over φs with two free variables.
Proof. Follows directly by setting φ(x, y) to be the formula x ∼q y and x to
be a. Then we have
a ∼q a↔ a ∼q b,
and thus that a ∼q b. ⊣
Proposition 13. Let q be a set of operations on Ω.
1. R ⊆ Ωk is definable in L −∞∞(q, a)a∈Ω iff R is invariant under ∼q.
2. Q↾q = ∪(Q/ ∼q)
Proof. (1). The left to right implication is immediate. For the other impli-
cation assume R is invariant under ∼q. Let φR(x1, ..., xn) be the formula∨
〈a1,...,an〉∈R
∧
1≤i≤n
ai ∼q xi
defining R. If a¯ ∈ R, Ω, q  φ(a¯) since ∼q is reflexive. If Ω, q  φ(a¯), there is
b¯ ∈ R such that a¯ ∼q b¯. Implying that a¯ ∈ R since R is invariant under ∼q.
(2). By (1) R ⊆ Ωk is definable in L−∞∞(q, a)a∈Ω iff it is of the form ∪R
′,
where R′ ⊆ (Ω/ ∼q)
k. This holds iff R = ∪(R/ ∼q).
Assume that R¯ ∈ Q↾q, then Ri is definable in L −∞∞(q, a)a∈Ω. Thus Ri =
∪(Ri/ ∼q), proving that R¯ ∈ ∪(Q/ ∼q). On the other hand if R¯ ∈ ∪(Q/ ∼q
) then each Ri satisfies Ri = ∪(Ri/ ∼q) and thus they are all definable in
L −∞∞(q, a)a∈Ω. From the definition it also follows that ∪(Q/ ∼q) ⊆ Q and thus
R¯ ∈ Q. ⊣
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Lemma 14. Let q be a set of operators and suppose pi ∈ Sim(q). Then
1. pi/∼q is a permutation of Ω/∼q,
2. if R is invariant under ∼q then R pi S, where S = pi(R), and
3. if a¯, b¯ ∈ Ωα, a¯ pi b¯ and φ(x¯) is a formula in L−∞∞(q) then Ω, q |= φ(a¯) ↔
φ(b¯).
Proof. Let ∼ be ∼q.
(1) To prove that pi/∼ is a function we prove that for all a, a′ ∈ Ω and all
b, b′ ∈ Ω such that a ∼ a′, a pi b and a′ pi b′ we have b ∼ b′. This is proved
by induction on the formulas in L−∞∞(q). In fact we prove, by induction, the
slightly stronger statement that if ψ(x, c¯) is a formula of L −∞∞(q,Ω) (observe
that c¯ can be an infinite string) then Ω, q |= φ(b, c¯) iff Ω, q |= φ(b′, c¯).
For the base case take R ∈ q and suppose R(b, c¯). Let d¯ be such that d¯ pi c¯,
then R(a, d¯) since a, d¯ pi b, c¯. Now R(a′, d¯) since a ∼ a′ and then we have R(b′, c¯)
since a′, d¯ pi b′, c¯.
For the induction steps negation, disjunction and existential quantification
are easy. Let us thus take Q ∈ q and suppose Ω, q |= Qx¯φ(b, c¯, x¯). Then
Jφ(b, c¯, x¯)KΩx¯ ∈ Q and by the induction hypothesis Jφ(b
′, c¯, x¯)KΩx¯ = Jφ(b, c¯, x¯)K
Ω
x¯
and thus Ω, q |= Qx¯φ(b′, c¯, x¯).
The proof of the bijective property is very similar and left to the reader.
(2) From (1) we have that if pi ∈ Sim(q) and R respects ∼ then R pi S iff
S = pi(R). This is because if a¯ pi b¯ and b¯ ∈ pi(R) then there is a¯′ ∈ R such that
a¯′ pi b¯ and so by (1) a¯ ∼ a¯′ and since R respects ∼, a¯ ∈ R.
(3) The proof is by induction on φ. For the base case we have a¯ pi b¯, where
pi ∈ Sim(q), and R ∈ q. Thus R is invariant under pi and Ra¯ iff Rb¯.
For the induction step negation and (infinite) conjuntion is trivial. For the case
with (an infinite string of) existential quantifers assume that Ω, q |= ∃x¯φ(a¯, x¯) is
true and thus there are c¯ such that Ω, q |= φ(a¯, c¯). Since pi is a similarity relation
there are d¯ such that a¯, c¯ pi b¯, d¯ and thus by the induction hypothesis we have
Ω, q |= φ(b¯, d¯) and thus Ω, q |= ∃x¯φ(b¯, x¯).
We are left with the case of a generalized quantifier Q ∈ q. Suppose Ω, q |=
Qx¯φ(a¯, x¯), i.e., that R = Jφ(a¯, x¯)KΩx¯ ∈ Q. Since pi ∈ Sim(q), R is invariant under
∼ and by (2) R pi S where S = pi(R), we have S ∈ Q. Now, pi(R) = S is
Jφ(b¯, x¯)KΩx¯ and thus Ω, q |= Qx¯φ(b¯, x¯). ⊣
Next we prove that ≈Π satisfies similar properties:
Lemma 15. Let Π be a monoid of similarites with involution and pi ∈ Π. Then
1. pi/≈Π is a permutation of Ω/≈Π,
2. if R is invariant under ≈ then R pi S, where S = pi(R), and
3. if also ≈Π ∈ Π, a¯, b¯ ∈ Ωα, a¯ pi b¯ and φ(x¯) is a formula in L −∞∞(Inv(Π))
then Ω, Inv(Π) |= φ(a¯)↔ φ(b¯).
Proof. Let ≈ be ≈Π.
(1) To prove that pi/≈ is a function we prove that for all a, a′ ∈ Ω and all
b, b′ ∈ Ω such that a ≈ a′, a pi b and a pi b′ we have b ≈ b′. This follows directly
from Π being closed under composition and taking inverses. The proof of the
bijective property is similar and left to the reader.
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(2) If a¯ pi b¯ and b¯ ∈ pi(R) then there is a¯′ ∈ R such that a¯′ pi b¯ and so by (1)
a¯ ≈ a¯′ and since R is invariant under ≈, a¯ ∈ R.
(3) The proof is by induction on φ. For the base case we have a¯ pi b¯, where
pi ∈ Π, and R ∈ Inv(Π). Thus R is invariant under pi and Ra¯ iff Rb¯.
For the induction step negation and (infinite) conjuntion is trivial. For the
case with (an infinite string of) existential quantifiers assume that Ω, Inv(Π) |=
∃x¯φ(a¯, x¯) is true and thus there are c¯ such that Ω, Inv(Π) |= φ(a¯, c¯). Since pi is
a similarity relation there are d¯ such that a¯, c¯ pi b¯, d¯ and thus by the induction
hypothesis we have Ω, Inv(Π) |= φ(b¯, d¯) and Ω, Inv(Pi) |= ∃x¯φ(b¯, x¯).
We are left with the case of a generalized quantifier Q ∈ q. Suppose Qx¯φ(a¯, x¯),
i.e., that R = Jφ(a¯, x¯)KΩx¯ ∈ Q. If R is invariant under ≈ we are finished since
then by (2) R pi S where S = pi(R), we have S ∈ Q. Now, pi(R) = S is Jφ(b¯, x¯)KΩx¯
and thus Ω, Inv(Π) |= Qx¯φ(b¯, x¯). To see that R is invariant under ≈ take c¯ ∈ R
and d¯ such that c¯ ≈ d¯. There is pi ∈ Π such that c¯ pi d¯ and then since ≈Π ∈ Π,
pi′ = pi ◦ ≈ ∈ Π and a¯, c¯ pi′ a¯, d¯, and thus Ω, Inv(Π) |= φ(a¯, c¯) implies that
Ω, Inv(Π) |= φ(a¯, d¯) by the induction hypothesis and we have d¯ ∈ R. ⊣
In fact ≈Π and ∼q are very much related as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 16. Let q be a set of operators and Π a monoid with involution,
then
1. if ≈Π ∈ Π, then ≈Π is the same relation as ∼Inv(Π), and
2. ∼q is the same as ≈Sim(q).
Proof. (1) First, ≈Π ⊆ ∼Inv(Π). Assume a ≈Π b. For any c ∈ Ω, there is a
pi ∈ Π such that ac pi bc, hence, by (3) in Lemma 15 and since Π is full, for every
formula φ(x, y) in L−∞∞(Inv(Π)), we have Ω, Inv(Π)  φ(a, c) iff Ω, Inv(Π) 
φ(b, c). By Lemma 12, this suffices for a ∼Inv(Π) b.
Second, ≈Π ⊇ ∼Inv(Π). Assume a ∼Inv(Π) b. For any c¯ ∈ Ω
k, define a relation
HΠac¯ of arity k+1 by H
Π
ac¯ = {d¯ ∈ Ω
k+1 | there is pi ∈ Π such that ac¯ pi d¯}. Check
that HΠac¯ is invariant under Π. Assume that d¯ pi d¯
′ for some pi ∈ Π. If d¯ ∈ HΠac¯,
there is a pi′ ∈ Π with a, c¯ pi′ d¯. Since Π is closed under composition, pi′ ◦ pi ∈ Π,
and then a, c¯ pi′ ◦ pi d¯′ implies d¯′ ∈ Hac¯,Π. If d¯′ ∈ HΠac¯, there is a pi
′ ∈ Π with
a, c¯ pi′ d¯′. Since Π is closed under composition and taking converses, pi′ ◦pi` ∈ Π,
and then a, c¯ pi′ ◦ pi` d¯ implies d¯ ∈ HΠac¯. Therefore H
Π
ac¯ is the interpretation of
a predicate symbol P in the language L −∞∞(Inv(Π)). By definition, Ω, Inv(Π) 
P (a, c¯). Since a ∼Inv(Π) b, this implies Ω, Inv(Π)  P (b, c¯), hence there is a pi ∈ Π
such that ac¯ pi bc¯.
(2) First, ∼q⊇≈Sim(q). Assume a ≈Sim(q) b. For any c ∈ Ω, there is a pi ∈ Π
such that ac pi bc, hence, by (3) in Lemma 14, for every formula φ(x, y) in
L −∞∞(q), we have Ω, q  φ(a, c) iff Ω, q  φ(b, c). By Lemma 12, this suffices for
a ∼Inv(Π) b.
Second, ∼q⊆≈Sim(q). Assume a ∼q b. Let c¯ ∈ Ω
k, we need to find a pi ∈≈Sim(q)
with ac¯ pibc¯. It is sufficient to show that H
Sim(q)
ac¯ is definable in L
−
∞∞(q) by some
formula ϕ, because then Ω, q  ϕ(a, c¯) and a ∼q b implies Ω, q  ϕ(b, c¯), giving
the needed pi.
H
Sim(q)
ac¯ is invariant under Sim(q) since Sim(q) is closed under compositions.
By Proposition 13, H
Sim(q)
ac¯ is definable in L
−
∞∞(q,Ω) if H
Sim(q)
ac¯ is invariant
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under ∼q. Thus, it is sufficient to show that ∼q∈ Sim(q). Let R be an n-ary
relation in q, d1...dn ∈ R and d1...dn ∼q d′1...d
′
n. d1...dn ∈ R and d1 ∼q d
′
1,
hence d′1d2...dn ∈ R, and by repeating this reasoning, d
′
1...d
′
n ∈ R. Let Q be a
quantifier in q, R¯ and S¯ sequences of relations on Ω invariant under ∼q and of
a type appropriate for Q. We need that if R¯ ∼q S¯, then R¯ ∈ Q iff S¯ ∈ Q. It is
sufficient to note that if R is invariant under ∼q and R ∼q S, then R = S. Let
d¯ ∈ R and e¯ such that e¯ ∼q d¯. e¯ ∈ R since R is invariant under ∼q, hence since
R ∼q S, d¯ ∈ S. Similarly, let d¯ ∈ S and e¯ such that e¯ ∼q d¯. Since R ∼q S, e¯ ∈ R,
and then e¯ ∼q d¯ and the fact that R is invariant under ∼q implies d¯ ∈ R. ⊣
Lemma 17. Sim(q) is a full monoid.
Proof. Let Π = Sim(q). To check that Π is closed under taking converses
is trivial, and by using (2) of Lemma 14 we can easily see that Π is also closed
under compositions.
We prove that if pi ∈ Π and pi′ ⊆ pi is a similarity relation then pi′ ∈ Π. It
is trivial to check that every relation of q is invariant under pi′. For the case of
quantifiers let R pi′ S be such that R and S are invariant under ∼q. Then R pi S
because if not we may assume, without loss of generality, there are a¯ pi b¯, a¯ ∈ R
and b¯ /∈ S. There are c¯ such that a¯ pi′ c¯ and thus, since both a¯ pi b¯ and a¯ pi c¯
we have by (1) in Lemma 14 that b¯ ∼q c¯ contradicting that S is invariant under
∼q. ⊣
Given a set of operations q we now know that ∼q is the same as ≈Sim(q)
so when working with Inv(Sim(q)) we can use ∼q instead of ≈Sim(q); this will
implicity be used in the following proposition.
Proposition 18. Let q be a set of operators and ∼ be ∼q. We have
1. Sim(q)/∼ is Aut(q/∼), and
2. Inv(Sim(q)) is the set of all quantifers Q such that Q/∼ is in Inv(Aut(q/∼)).
Proof. (1) For the left-to-right inclusion let pi ∈ Sim(q). By Lemma 14,
f = pi/∼ is a bijection on Ω/∼ and if Q ∈ q then R ∈ Q/∼ iff ∪R ∈ Q iff
pi(∪R) ∈ Q iff ∪f(R) ∈ Q iff f(R) ∈ Q/∼.
For the other inclusion let f ∈ Aut(q/∼). Define a pi b iff f([a]) = [b]. Then
pi is a similarity relation on Ω and f = pi/∼. Let Q ∈ q and R is invariant
under ∼ then R ∈ Q iff R/∼ ∈ Q/∼ iff f(R/∼) ∈ Q/∼ iff ∪f(R/∼) ∈ Q. But
∪f(R/∼) = pi(R). We have proved that R ∈ Q iff pi(R) ∈ Q, and thus Q is
invariant under pi.
(2) Take Q ∈ Inv(Sim(q)) and f ∈ Aut(q/∼). By (1) choose pi ∈ Sim(q) such
that f = pi/∼. Then R ∈ Q/∼ iff ∪R ∈ Q iff pi(∪R) ∈ Q iff pi(∪R)/∼ ∈ Q/∼,
but pi(∪R)/∼ = f(R).
On the other hand take Q such that Q/∼ ∈ Inv(Aut(q/∼)), R invariant under
∼ and pi ∈ Sim(q), then f = pi/∼ is in Aut(q/∼). Thus R ∈ Q iff R/∼ ∈ Q/∼
iff f(R/∼) ∈ Q/∼ iff ∪f(R/∼) ∈ Q, but ∪f(R/∼) = pi(R). ⊣
From this proposition we get what was announced as the main theorem of this
section:
Theorem 11. Let q be a set of operations and Π a set of similarities, then
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1. Q ∈ Inv(Sim(q)) iff Q↾q is definable in L−∞∞(q), and R ∈ Inv(Sim(q)) iff R
is definable in L −∞∞(q).
2. Sim(Inv(Π)) is the smallest full monoid including Π.
Proof. (1) By Proposition 18, Q ∈ Inv(Sim(q)) iff Q/∼ ∈ Inv(Aut(q/∼)).
Thus, by Theorem 4, Q/∼ is definable in L∞∞(q/∼) by a sentence φ. Let φ′ be
the translation of φ into L−∞∞(q) where = is replaced by ∼.
By induction of formulas we see that for all a¯ ∈ Ω and all ψ(x¯) in L∞∞(q/∼):
Ω/∼ |= ψ([a¯]) iff Ω |= ψ′(a¯),
where, again, ψ′ is the translation of ψ into L−∞∞(q).
It follows that φ′ defines ∪(Q/∼) and since ∼ is definable in L−∞∞(q) we have
what we wanted.
(2) Follows by the same argument as in (1).
(3) We prove that for a full monoid Π we have that Sim(Inv(Π)) = Π. The
general theorem then follows from the fact that every Sim(q) is a full monoid.
The inclusion Π ⊆ Sim(Inv(Π)) is trivial. For the other includion let H =
Π/≈. It is a group of permutations by Lemma 15. By straightforward checking
we see that
Inv(Π)/≈ = Inv(H).
From (1) in Proposition 18 we get that Sim(Inv(Π))/≈ = Aut(Inv(Π)/≈) and
thus that this is equal to Aut(Inv(H)), which by Theorem 4 is nothing else than
H . Thus,
Sim(Inv(Π))/≈ = Π/≈
and by the assumption that Π is full we get that Sim(Inv(Π)) = Π: If pi ∈
Sim(Inv(Π)) then there is pi′ ∈ Π such that pi′/≈ = pi/≈, and then pi ⊆ (≈ ◦ pi′ ◦
≈), and thus pi ∈ Π. ⊣
§5. Concluding remarks.
5.1. Invariance under permutation as a logicality criterion. Let us
first go back to languages with equality and groups of permutations. The main
benefit of a Krasnerian approach to McGee’s result is to show that the correspon-
dence between purportedly logical operations on a domain and the symmetric
group on that set is a special case of the general duality which holds between
sets of relations and groups of permutations, when sets of relations consist in
first-order and second-order relations closed under definability in L∞∞. The
light thus shed on McGee’s result is ambiguous, depending on how the closure
condition is looked at. One might insist that groups of permutations are con-
sequently shown to be a sure guide to characterizing sets of relations. When
L∞∞ provides the logical context, any relevant structure may be characterized
in terms of invariance under permutation, and therefore the structure consisting
of all and only logical relations on a given domain, in particular, is thus char-
acterizable. Now which group of permutations should be the one giving us all
(and only the) logical relations? Since logical notions have generality as their
distinguishing feature, we should go for the largest possible group, and take all
permutations: this is the gist of the generality argument. Since logic is formal
and does not make differences between objects, we should require insensitivity
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to any possible way of switching objects, and take again all permutations: this is
the gist of the formality argument. Of course, several steps are in need of further
justification. Maybe identifying ‘being a logical notion’ and ‘being a general no-
tion’ is too quick, because generality remains underspecified. Or maybe ‘being
formal’ and ‘not making distinctions between objects’ are not quite the same –
see MacFarlane [16] for a thorough discussion of these issues. But our goal here
is not to challenge the relevance of the conceptual analysis in terms of generality
or indifference to objects. Our point is rather to suggest that these arguments
may be deemed to be on the right track only if we know that logical relations
are characterizable in terms of invariants of a group of permutations. Once this
characterizability is granted, both arguments go through, and nicely converge.
Seeing McGee’s result as a special case of a more encompassing Krasnerian
correspondence reveals L∞∞ to be a built-in feature of the framework. Defin-
ability in L∞∞ is the closure condition on sets of relations which corresponds to
working with groups of permutations, rather than with some other kind of trans-
formations. As soon as we choose to explicate logicality (either qua generality or
qua formality) in terms of groups of permutation, we let infinitary syntax sneak
in. Now the generality and formality arguments tell us which group of permuta-
tions we should pick, if we are to single out logical relations by picking one, but
they do not tell us that we should single out logical relations by picking a group
of permutations to start with. Thus, the fact that the infinitary logic L∞∞ ends
up being a full-blown logic on this account of logicality might be deemed an
artificial effect of the invariance under permutation framework. McGee himself
took his result to be an argument in favor of invariance for permutation as a log-
icality criterion, “inasmuch as every operation on the list is intuitively logical”
([17], p.567), the list being the list of basic operations of L∞∞. But this presup-
poses that having reasons to count conjunction as logical automatically counts as
having reasons to count infinitary conjunction, and similarly for quantification.
Blaming invariance under permutation for its infinitary upshot is no new crit-
icism (see [8], [3] and [7]), but, in the light of the generalized Krasnerian corre-
spondence, this infinitary burden is seen to be the very consequence of the use of
permutations in order to demarcate the extensions that are admissible for logical
constants.
5.2. Invariance under similarity as a logicality criterion. Invariance
under similarities has been put forward as an alternative logicality criterion by
Feferman [8].13 The shift from permutations to similarities makes for greater
generality, which is crucial for the generality argument. It also provides a way
to escape the commitment of permutations to cardinalities. Every cardinality
quantifier, no matter how wild (‘there are at least ℵ17 many’) is permutation
invariant. Shifting to invariance under similarities expells these wild creatures
from the paradise of logical quantifiers.14
13Feferman now favors mixed approches in which invariance only provides necessary condi-
tions for logicality, see [7] and [9].
14Feferman had another reason to favor similarities, namely the fact that they can relate do-
mains of different sizes, and hence force a greater homogeneity for the extensions of quantifiers
across domains. We do not deal with across-domain invariance here.
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Feferman shows that an operation is definable in first-order logic without
equality just in case it is definable in the λ-calculus from homomorphism invari-
ant15 monadic quantifiers and asks whether “there is a natural characterization
of the homomorphims invariant propositional operations in general, in terms of
logics extending the predicate calculus” ([8], p. 47). The question is all the more
pressing that the syntactic restriction to monadic quantifiers lacks a proper justi-
fication. With reference to an unpublished proof given in [2], it has been claimed
that invariance under homomorphism corresponds to definability in pure L−∞∞
(see [3] and [7]). The proof, however, was faulty, breaking down because of unde-
finable subsets. Theorem 11 provides a correct generalization. However, it does
not answer Feferman’s exact question, since the correspondence we eventually
get only holds with respect to the action of quantifiers on definable sets. What
we know by Theorem 11 is that invariance under homomorphism corresponds
to definability in pure L−∞∞ when quantifiers are restricted to their action on
definable subsets of the domain. Whether the original claim was correct is still
unknown.
The restriction to definable sets notwithstanding, Theorem 11 shows that the
shift from permutations to similarities or homorphisms does not change the pic-
ture when it comes to the infinitary explosion of invariance criteria: infinitary
syntax is every bit as much hardwired in invariance under similarities as it is in
invariance under permutations. Moreover, invariance criteria do not seem well
suited to help us adjudicate the status of equality as a logical constant or not.
As highlighted by the close parallelism between Theorem 4 and Theorem 11, al-
lowing identity at level of relations exactly corresponds to banning non-injective
functions at the level of invariance conditions. Whether there are better grounds
on which to adjudicate the issue, or whether it should be considered as primarily
a matter of convention remains to be seen.
5.3. Further perspective. To conclude, we would like to mention two lines
of further research. The first one is somewhat tangential to the main project.
We have seen that automorphism groups of monadic second order structures are
characterized as closed groups in a way similar to the first-order case. What do
these closed groups tell us about the structures they come from? The question
is whether remarkable properties of monadic second order structures can be
reduced to properties of automorphism groups – a famous example in the first-
order case is the Ryll-Nardzewski theorem which says that being ℵ0 categorical
is such a property.
The second line of research concerns further inquiries into the duality between
sets of transformations and sets of relations closed with respect to definability
in a given logic. Theorem 11 leaves as an open question whether the restriction
to the definable parts of quantifiers is mandatory. More generally, this duality
could be extended to other kinds of transformations and less demanding closure
conditions. In [1], Barwise provides such a result for first-order relations with
respect to semi-automorphisms (automorphisms between substructures which
are part of a back and forth system) and closure under definability in L∞ω. This
suggests generalizing again to second-order relations. Another tempting move
15Homomorphism invariance is equivalent to invariance under similarities.
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would consist in getting to Lωω by suitably weakening the conditions on semi-
automorphisms. Finally, the connection between properties of the logical syntax
and properties of the transformations still remains to be fully understood. It
would be nice to achieve even greater generality by connecting explicitly abstract
properties of transformations (e.g. the depth of Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games) and
properties of the syntax for the logic providing the closure condition.
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